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At the beginning of the 21 century, most people are
no longer surprised by technological revolutions. The
twentieth century brought us information technology
and biotechnology: key technologies for pioneering
innovations such as the computer, the Internet and
genetically modified plants. In the transition to the
twenty-first century, two other important develop-
ments: nanotechnology (the research and design of
materials at the smallest level possible) and cognitive
science came along too.
But that will not be the end of it if we are to believe
the National Science Foundation (NSF). At the end of
2002, Roco and Bainbridge, the organizers of the
workshop ‘Converging Technologies: Improving
Human Performance’ did not just announce the next
revolution in science and technology, but a whole new
era, a New Renaissance [4]. In their view, the
boundaries between nanotechnology, biotechnology,
information technology and the cognitive sciences
(NBIC) will disappear and this will open up the way
for an unprecedented holistic concept of what it means
to be human, ranging from the way the tiniest
components in our cells interrelate to the way we
think and feel. In the twenty-first century, according to
their prophecy, human beings will be able to improve
themselves radically.
In this trend to convergence, two characteristics
keep recurring: informatization and miniaturization.
Numerous processes, whether they take place in the
organic world, the inorganic world, or in the world of
cognition, are nowadays described in terms of
obtaining, providing, processing and providing feed-
back on information. As a result, previously incom-
patible elements can now be connected to one
another. Genes and other cell components contain a
‘code’ that can be ‘cracked’ and ‘read’ by biosensors;
information from our minds can be ‘loaded into a
computer’ and vice versa; persuasive technology
controls our behaviour by confronting our brains with
certain information; synthetic biology is conceivable
because in the future we ourselves will combine and
alter the information stored in genes so that we can
steer organisms in a direction determined by us.
Secondly, converging technologies are founded on a
far-reaching miniaturization of devices that has been
made possible by the nanosciences and nanotechnology.
These enable us to create contact points between brains
and computers, between substances in our bloodstream
and ‘wet sensors’, between someone’s clothing and his
or her intelligent living environment. It also means that
we can put together cells from biological building
blocks. Nanoproducts, such as minuscule electrodes and
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) chips, are
crucial for the explosive growth in information
exchange and feedback too.
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At this early stage, it is difficult to argue for an
optimistic or pessimistic stance towards these develop-
ments. There are, after all, many uncertainties involved.
More specifically, we are facing a triple challenge here.
Firstly, there is uncertainty regarding the facts: what is
going to happen? A quick look at the past shows that
many scientific and technological developments failed
to keep their promise and meet the original expect-
ations. As a scientific area develops, further investiga-
tion in that area tends to reveal that reality is much
more complicated than was initially foreseen.
Secondly, there is uncertainty regarding norms:
how desirable do we think that the possibilities
created by the converging technologies are? This is
a highly contested issue, especially because familiar
normative frameworks tend to evolve in response to
the emerging technologies [2, 7]. When, for example,
a new technology succeeds in creating new practical
possibilities, the normative question arises: are these
new actions morally allowed? Take for instance the
discussion on prenatal genetic diagnostics: how far
are we willing to broaden the criteria for the genetic
selection of embryos? The question may also be
raised in reverse: when technology provides people
with new means to act, they may be morally obliged
to do so. Not only do new interests and desires follow
in the wake of new technologies (after all, supply
influences demand), but these technologies often
result in new bans, rights, duties and responsibilities
as well. And in all likelihood, this will be also the
case with converging technologies.
Thirdly, emerging technologies sometimes challenge
the interpretative frameworks we use to categorize
reality. Facts, norms and values are not things that we
observe directly. Our perception is always mediated
through culturally determined concepts and classifica-
tion schemes. These schemes jointly make up what is
known as our ‘symbolic order’, a concept coined by
the famous anthropologist Mary Douglas [1]. The
symbolic order categorizes reality by drawing bound-
aries. It applies fundamental distinctions, for instance
between life and death, man and woman, human and
thing, human and animal, organic and inorganic, body
and mind, inside and outside, guilty and innocent, fate
and human intent, rational and irrational, natural and
artificial, receiving and making, healthy and sick,
active and passive, normal and abnormal, and so on.
It is this order that determines how we understand
ourselves, our world and our place in that world.
In our daily lives we confidently set course
based on the compass of such obvious boundaries
and distinctions. But new technologies sometimes
bring us face to face with unexpected obstacles,
possibilities, questions and uncertainties that shake
the foundations of this symbolic order [5]. Because
the symbolic order influences not only our account
of the facts, but also our norms and values, this third
form of uncertainty is the most fundamental.
This special issue of NanoEthics examines this
third form of uncertainty in particular. How is the
existing symbolic order challenged by converging
technologies? How does this challenge affect attempts
to subject these new technologies to a normative
judgement? And how can we perhaps find a way out
of the problems sketched? These questions are central
to the following papers.
It is worthwhile to contrast our approach with the
body of work in ethics that aims to clarify the
meaning of existing (moral) concepts. By way of
thought experiments, for example, philosophers ex-
amine the implications and boundaries of life and
death, human and animal, body and mind as well as
other concepts. And indeed, some of the current
technological developments were part of such thought
experiments. Our approach in this special issue differs
from this more traditional ethical approach. Our
starting point is the pragmatist conviction that the
symbolic order created by humans is firmly rooted in
practices and ways of living [3]. As a consequence,
the symbolic order is not static but evolves with these
practices. Technological innovation is an important
cause of change and as such of ‘symbolic confusion’.
We do not want to imply, however, that concepts just
passively follow practice. When practical developments
and symbolic order do not fit anymore, adjustments in
either direction may be necessary [8]. Whether or not
specific concepts will be replaced by alternative
concepts and distinctions is an open question. Even if
concepts keep being used, however, they are likely to
be reinterpreted or specified in view of the new
practices. It is this potential evolution of meaning the
authors in this special issue are exploring.
The first four contributions in this special issue
of Nano-ethics analyze different fields of techno-
logical convergence: brain-machine interaction,
persuasive technologies, molecular medicine and
synthetic biology, respectively. In each case, at least
two of the four NBIC key technologies (nanotech-
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nology, biotechnology, information technology and
cognitive science) converge.
Maartje Schermer discusses brain-machine inter-
actions whereby brains and computers are connected
to one other. All four technologies play a role here.
Many boundaries blur in this application, including
those between man and machine, appearance and
reality, experience and design of the world, and inside
and outside our bodies (in the case of the exoskeleton
connected to the brain).
Peter Paul Verbeek investigates the so-called
persuasive technologies (technologies that are
designed to influence our behaviour and ‘nudge’ it
in a specific direction) [6]. These technologies are
based on the interaction between information tech-
nology and cognitive science and they problematize
the symbolic boundary between humans agents and
artefacts. Moreover, they shift the meaning of
crucial moral concepts like freedom and responsi-
bility. Verbeek argues that these new technologies
urge us to blur the boundaries between humans and
technologies at the level of conceptual and moral
frameworks.
Marianne Boenink writes about the convergence of
biotechnology, information technology and nanotech-
nology in molecular medicine and investigates how
this convergence affects current thinking about health
and disease. New medical technology constructs its
own image of the ‘natural’ history of disease and in
the process shifts the boundary between ‘normal’ and
‘deviant’ bodily functioning. Molecular medicine on
the one hand seems to build on a cascade model of
disease, thereby reinforcing tendencies towards early
diagnosis and treatment. On the other hand, it aims at
showing personal patterns in bodily functioning,
which opens up possibilities for highly individual
definitions of what is and is not experienced as
disease. Boenink discusses both the tensions and the
opportunities implied by these shifts in our conceptual-
ization of ‘disease’ and ‘health’.
Synthetic biology, which is endeavouring to
create artificial life forms, takes centre stage in
Henk van den Belt’s contribution. Here, too,
information technology and nanotechnology make
their influence on biotechnology felt. Synthetic
biology challenges such fundamental distinctions
as those between dead and living, natural and
artificial, the evolved and the designed. Van den
Belt analyses two arguments often used to articulate
uneasiness about these developments: the ‘playing
God’ and ‘following Frankenstein’ arguments. He
argues that the concerns voiced in these arguments
are often narrowly anthropocentric. As long as
synthetic biology does not directly affect human
life, we will probably be able to deal with the
conceptual shifts.
The final contribution by Swierstra, Van Est, and
Boenink, reflects on the technological developments
and conceptual shifts laid bare in the four preceding
papers. Do converging technologies in general confront
our symbolic order with specific challenges and if so,
what does this mean for policy and politics? The
authors argue that NBIC-convergence extends a parti-
cular form of ‘making’—building—that was formerly
restricted to inorganic matter, to organic life, including
human life. This shift is potentially far-reaching in its
consequences, as up to now living organisms were
respected as somehow special because they have their
own ‘action program’, as being ‘agents’ who deserve a
form of respect that we do not owe to inorganic matter.
For humans, the question becomes prominent how
much control over the outer and inner world is
compatible with the good life. The authors conclude
that public debate on converging technologies should
evolve around the central issue of striking the right
balance between control and acceptance.
This special issue finds its origin in a book com-
missioned by the Dutch Rathenau Institute, an inde-
pendent institute for technology assessment that
advises politicians, policy makers and the general
public on issues on the interface between science,
technology and society. The book was edited by
Tsjalling Swierstra, Marianne Boenink, Rinie van Est
and Bart Walhout, published in 2009 and titled
Leven als bouwpakket (Life as a construction kit)
[9]. The contributions to this issue are revised and
updated versions of the chapters of that book. The
authors thank the Rathenau Institute for providing funds
for translating and checking the contributions in this
issue of Nanoethics. They also want to thank the
anonymous reviewers who have greatly contributed
to improve the concept articles.
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